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In Pursuit of Bigfoot: Confronting Oil and Gas 
Mythology in Louisiana 
J. Michael Veron 
“I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but 
how myths operate in men’s minds without their being aware of the 
fact.”1 
INTRODUCTION: THE CURIOUS FATE OF SENATE RESOLUTION 142 
The connection between wealth and political influence is an 
obvious one, and it is nowhere more obvious than in the state of 
Louisiana. From at least the time of Huey Long,2 the adjectives 
“wealthy” and “powerful” have been synonymous with political 
influence in the Bayou State. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by J. MICHAEL VERON. 
 * B.A. 1972, J.D. 1974, Tulane University; LL.M. 1976, Harvard 
University. Member, Veron, Bice, Palermo & Wilson, LLC, Lake Charles, 
Louisiana. Former adjunct professor of law, LSU Law Center, Tulane Law 
School. Member, Louisiana Bar. The author was lead counsel for the plaintiffs 
in Amoco Production Co. v. Texas Meridian Resources Exploration, 180 F.3d 
664 (5th Cir. 1999), Corbello v. Iowa Production Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 
2003), and Amoco Production Co. v. Texaco, 838 So. 2d 821 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 845 So. 2d 1096 (La. 2003). The author wishes to thank his partners and 
staff, as well as John Arnold and the environmental law firms of Jones, 
Swanson, Huddell & Garrison and Talbot, Carmouche & Marcello for their 
assistance in locating certain research materials. However, any errors remain the 
sole responsibility of the author. 
 1. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, 1 THE RAW AND THE COOKED: MYTHOLOGIQUES 
12 (1983). 
 2. Huey Long served as the Governor of Louisiana from 1928 to 1932. At 
the time, he was prohibited by law from serving consecutive terms, so he 
successfully ran for a seat in the United States Senate, where he served until he 
was assassinated in the halls of the Louisiana State Capitol on September 10, 
1935. Long was a colorful populist whose life and times inspired Robert Penn 
Warren’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 1946 novel, All the King’s Men. Interesting 
accounts of Long’s life have been written by LSU faculty members. The first 
noteworthy effort was the 1981 biography by T. Harry Williams, Huey Long. 
More recently, Richard D. White’s 2006 book, Kingfish: The Reign of Huey P. 
Long, told the story again. Regardless of which account one reads, it is generally 
agreed that Long’s political career was marked by controversy and corruption. 
As one writer noted, the flamboyant Long was perceived either as a political 
messiah or a dictator-in-waiting. See David Oshinsky, Every Man a King: A 
New Biography Studies the Many Faces of Huey Long, Lawmaker and 
Lawbreaker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at F9 (reviewing RICHARD D. WHITE, 
JR., KINGFISH: THE REIGN OF HUEY P. LONG (2006)), available at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/books/review/16oshinsky.html, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/AWZ2-C8UT. 
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Anyone demanding proof of that proposition need look no 
further than the 2014 Louisiana Legislature. During that Regular 
Session, north Louisiana Democratic Senator Richard Gallot, Jr., 
introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 142.3 The stated 
purpose of the resolution was to request the Department of 
Revenue and the Department of Natural Resources to work with 
the Office of the Legislative Auditor to verify the accuracy of 
payments received by the state for oil and gas severance taxes and 
mineral royalties.4  
The seemingly uncontroversial measure sailed through the 
Senate on May 20, 2014, by a unanimous 35–0 vote.5 It was then 
sent to the House of Representatives, where less than two weeks 
later it failed to receive the required majority and was defeated on 
June 2, 2014, in a roll call vote of 48 to 44.6 
At first glance, one is hard pressed to understand how such an 
innocuous measure could receive a single “nay” vote, much less 44 
of them. The answer lies in the simple fact that the resolution went 
unnoticed by the only interest group it could affect adversely when 
it passed in the Senate. It was only after the resolution was sent to 
the House that the oil industry’s lobbyists swarmed the lower 
chamber and successfully lobbied for the required number of votes 
to defeat the resolution. 
The fate of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 142 is proof of 
the political influence—indeed, one might argue domination—that 
the oil industry enjoys in Louisiana. However, the defeat of the 
resolution does not explain why or how the industry is able to 
wield such power. Clearly, the rise of the Republican Party in 
Louisiana, and across the South, has something to do with it. At 
the time of the 2014 Legislative Session, not a single Democrat 
held statewide office in Louisiana, and both legislative chambers 
had Republican majorities. 
But no elected official, regardless of political affiliation, 
willingly admits that he or she is voting for a special interest 
because of the potential for wealth or power. Like lawyers, all 
politicians like to speak the language of justification. In other 
words, they need to have a politically plausible explanation for any 
                                                                                                             
 3. See S. Res. 2014 Leg., 114th Reg. Sess. (La. 2014).  
 4. Id. at 1.  
 5. See Roll Call: LA SCR142 | 2014 | Regular Session, LEGISSCAN, 
https://legiscan.com/LA/rollcall/SCR142/id/365533, archived at https://perma 
.cc/35E2-VK64 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).  
 6. See LA SCR142 | 2014 | Regular Session, LEGISSCAN, https://legiscan 
.com/LA/bill/SCR142/2014, archived at https://perma.cc/F3CH-7DKX (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2015).  
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position they take. And lobbyists serve to provide legislators with 
that rationalization.  
That is where mythology serves a great political purpose. For 
purposes of this discussion, mythology is defined as a set of 
exaggerated or fictitious “stories or beliefs about a particular 
institution or situation.”7 The role of mythology in law and politics 
is not well understood, perhaps because it has rarely been explored 
as a legitimate academic inquiry, at least in legal circles. But 
mythology plays a powerful role in how the oil industry effectively 
wields its political and legal influence in Louisiana, and it is 
clearly a subject that warrants discussion. 
As shown below, a myth can persist only if it is uncritically 
accepted. In the case of the mythology surrounding oil and gas in 
Louisiana, false beliefs continue to survive because their underlying 
premises are accepted as true regardless of whether the facts support 
them. Indeed, this Article shows that the evidence actually 
contradicts, rather than supports, their factual underpinnings. 
I. A (VERY) SHORT HISTORY OF OIL AND GAS 
REGULATION IN LOUISIANA 
Early efforts to produce hydrocarbons in Louisiana date back 
to the 1860s. However, the modern history of oil and gas in 
Louisiana began with an oil well that was drilled in 1901 in a rice 
field on the “Mamou Prairie” in the community of Evangeline near 
Jennings,8 ultimately leading to the creation of the Jennings Field. 
From there, oil and gas wells quickly proliferated across the state. 
The second oil field in the state was Caddo Field in north 
Louisiana, which was created in 1906 and is the most widely 
recognized. 
Not unexpectedly—at least in hindsight—the infant industry 
experienced significant growing pains, particularly in the form of 
waste and contamination. Early efforts to control downhole 
pressures were largely ineffective, with numerous “gushers” 
                                                                                                             
 7. Mythology Definition, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, http://www.oxford 
dictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/mythology, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/SD5U-YT5H (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).  
 8. For a concise history, see First Oil Well in Louisiana, LA. DEP’T OF 
NATURAL RES., OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm 
?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=48, archived at http://perma.cc/GY35-VBVD 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2015).  
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spewing oil across the landscape.9 Natural gas was considered a 
waste problem and was simply burned with flares.10  
It did not take long for environmental problems associated with 
oil and gas production in the state to catch the attention of the 
Louisiana Legislature in a big way. The state’s first legislative 
response to environmental issues created by oil and gas exploration 
and production activities was enacted in 1906.11 That statute 
prohibited setting wells on fire and required gas wells to be 
plugged and abandoned.12 Two years later, the 1908 Legislature 
passed legislation forming an agency to regulate oil and gas 
operations—the predecessor of what is now the state Office of 
Conservation.13 Then, in 1910, the Legislature enacted a law 
prohibiting the discharge of brine into fresh water sources of 
irrigation during certain times of the year.14 This statute was 
periodically amended until it prohibited brine contamination 
altogether.15  
Not surprisingly, the history of the state’s efforts to regulate oil 
and gas activities over the ensuing century reflects a constant tension 
between environmentalists and industry. The environmentalists have 
suffered from a fundamental political disadvantage: they are a non-
profit interest group and therefore are neither as well-organized nor as 
well-heeled as their counterparts, who comprise the wealthiest 
industry in the world.16 This disparity is reflected in the number of 
                                                                                                             
 9. JOSEPH R. DANCY, OIL & GAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5 (SMU School of 
Law).  
 10. For an interesting account of how gas flaring lit up the countryside 
surrounding oil fields in the 1930s and 1940s, see generally J. MICHAEL VERON, 
SHELL GAME: ONE FAMILY’S LONG BATTLE AGAINST BIG OIL (2007) [hereinafter 
VERON, SHELL GAME]. Nearly 100 years later, the problem persists. In North 
Dakota, natural gas produced from the Bakken Shale is burned while the more 
valuable oil is conserved and sold. The flares of natural gas became so large 
they could be seen in images transmitted from satellites. As a consequence, the 
state’s regulators were compelled to enact flaring standards in late 2014. See 
Brad Quick & Morgan Brennan, Inside North Dakota’s Latest Fracking 
Problem, CNBC (Aug. 22, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com 
/id/101934384, archived at http://perma.cc/5JWN-L4BF. 
 11. Act No. 71, 1906 La. Acts 111.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Act No. 144, 1908 La. Acts 200.  
 14. Act No. 183, 1910 La. Acts 272.  
 15. For a more detailed history, see J. Michael Veron, Oilfield 
Contamination Litigation in Louisiana: Property Rights on Trial, 25 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6 n.23 (2011) [hereinafter Veron, Oilfield]. 
 16. See Economic Impact, LA. MID-CONTINENT OIL AND GAS ASS’N, 
http://www.lmoga.com/issues-initiatives/economic-impact, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/55FK-45LA (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).  
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lobbyists who represent the industry before lawmakers.17 The 
success of environmental advocates has thus depended more on the 
existence of a crisis or issue that aroused public interest and 
attention.  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to trace that historic ebb 
and flow beyond the limited detail presented here. Instead, this 
Article will focus on the current state of affairs in Louisiana after 
more than 110 years of oil and gas production and exploration.  
It is generally believed that Louisiana enjoys greater oil and 
gas resources per capita than virtually any state in the United 
States. To be sure, Louisiana is one of the top oil- and gas-
producing states in the nation, regardless of population.18 Despite 
that remarkable, God-given advantage, the state continues to rank 
at or near the bottom of virtually every statistical category—
whether it be quality of life,19 education,20 or income.21 At the 
                                                                                                             
 17. See Dan Eggen and Kimberly Kindy, Three of Every Four Oil and Gas 
Lobbyists Worked for Federal Government, WASH. POST (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/21/AR2010072 
106468.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9468-HVKU. Information about the oil 
lobby in Washington, D.C., helps illustrate the point. The Center for Responsive 
Politics reported from public records that the oil industry spent $144.7 million, or 
more than $396,000 per day, lobbying the United States Congress and federal 
agencies in 2013 alone. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Oil & Gas, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=E01&year=2013, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RL3F-BLQS (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). Another source reports that 
three out of every four lobbyists who represent oil and gas companies in 
Washington previously worked in the federal government. This is “a proportion 
that far exceeds the usual revolving-door standards on Capitol Hill.” See Eggen & 
Kindy, supra. 
 18. See, e.g., Louisiana: State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. & ADMIN. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid 
=LA, archived at http://perma.cc/MFW7-WNQB.  
 19. CNBC ranked Louisiana second to last in quality of life. See Jennifer Leigh 
Parker, Best Quality for Life in CNBC’s Top States for Business 2011, CNBC (June 
28, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43344770#, archived at http://perma 
.cc/VAP7-CD4D. A survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development also ranked Louisiana near the bottom for “quality of life.” See 
Alabama Ranks Low in Quality of Life Study, TUSCALOOSANEWS.COM (Oct. 14, 
2014, 12:14 PM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20141014/NEWS/141 
019778, archived at http://perma.cc/YW5D-QPP3. However, another ranking done 
by British professors gave Louisiana the top spot among American states for 
“happiness levels.” Happiest Americans Live in States Ranked Highest for Quality in 
Life, SCIENCEDAILY.COM (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases 
/2009/12/091217141314.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/S9LZ-7Z3T. Perhaps 
ignorance is bliss, after all. 
 20. The American Legislative Exchange Council recently ranked Louisiana 
48th among the states and the District of Columbia in education. See Matthew 
Ladner & Dave Myslinski, Report Card on American Education: State 
Education Rankings, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/public 
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same time, the financial press routinely reports record profits for every 
oil company that does business in Louisiana.22  
Thus, there remains an obvious question: Why hasn’t the state 
shared in the massive bounty generated by the exploitation of its 
natural resources? The answer to that question lies in an understanding 
of the role that mythology has played in the oil industry’s exploitation 
of the state.  
II. HOW OIL AND GAS ARE PRESENTED IN THE LEGAL REGIME 
Oil and gas activities attract attention in the legal system in two 
primary ways. The first manifestation is in public law, which primarily 
concerns the state’s efforts to regulate the manner in which oil and gas 
operators drill and produce oil and gas wells. That law finds its most 
pertinent expression in Title 30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.23 
                                                                                                             
 
cations/report-card-on-american-education/, archived at http://perma.cc /UM27-
YF2H (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). The United States Chamber of Commerce 
ranked Louisiana 50th in its most recent education evaluation. See Mike Hasten, 
Louisiana Ranks Poorly in National Education Assessment, SHREVEPORT TIMES 
(Sept. 15, 2014, 6:56 PM), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/education/k- 
12/2014/09/15/louisiana-ranks-poorly-national-education-assessment/15694709/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/QG7J-3GMK. 
 21. As one newspaper account summarized the state of affairs: “Louisiana has 
one of the highest poverty rates, lowest median income levels and highest percentage 
of people without health insurance, according to statistics released Wednesday by 
the Census Bureau.” Jeff Adelson, Louisiana Ranks Poorly on Latest Income, 
Health Insurance Statistics, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:20 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/09/louisiana_ranks_poorly_on_late 
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8TAQ-ZVH2. A ranking published by Forbes 
Magazine placed the average income of workers in the two largest cities in the state, 
Baton Rouge and New Orleans, 74th and 76th, respectively, compared to peer cities 
across the country. See Jacquelyn Smith, The U.S. Cities Where People Earn the 
Biggest and Smallest Paychecks, FORBES.COM (Nov. 27, 2013, 9:35 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/Jacquelynsmith/2013/11/27/the-u-s-cities-where-people 
-earn-the-biggest-and-smallest-pay checks/2/, archived at http://perma.cc/G3L6- 
KV38. 
 22. Despite the lowest oil prices in years, the major oil companies reported 
record profits for the quarter ending October 2014. See, e.g., Bob Pisani, Look 
What Lower Oil Prices Do to Company Profits, CNBC (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:13 
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102113748, archived at http://perma.cc/3P3C-
SUEL; John Porretto, Big Oil’s Most Profitable Quarter Ever: $51.5 Billion, 
ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=5503955, archived at 
http://perma.cc/B7CW-BWQD (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 23. The primary regulations that govern oil and gas activities are found in 
Statewide Order 29-B, which is promulgated by the Louisiana Department of 
Natural Resources, Office of Conservation. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19 
(2013), available at http://doa.louisiana.gov/osr/lac/43v19/43v19.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/F4VC-8SE2. Although virtually all other environmental issues 
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The second manifestation is in private law, which primarily governs 
the legal relations, both in contract and tort, between oil companies 
                                                                                                             
 
are within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality, environmental issues caused by oil and gas operations in 
Louisiana are not. Instead, they are entrusted to the Department of Natural 
Resources, Office of Conservation. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29.l 
(2007). At the same time, the Office of Conservation is also charged with the 
statutory duty of “promotion and encouragement of exploration, production, and 
refining efforts for oil, intrastate gas, and other hydrocarbons.” Id. § 36:358(C). 
This gives rise to a significant conflict of interest that forces the regulator to 
choose which of two masters—the industry or the environment—he should 
serve. 
 This conflict of interest has manifested itself in lax enforcement of 
environmental rules and regulations. On May 28, 2014, the Office of the 
Louisiana Legislative Auditor issued its Performance Audit Regulation of Oil 
and Gas Wells and Management of Orphaned Wells, Office of Conservation, 
Department of Natural Resources. See LA. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, REGULATION 
OF OIL AND GAS WELLS AND MANAGEMENT OF ORPHANED WELLS (2014), 
available at http://app.lla.state.la.us/PublicReports.nsf/0/D6A0EBE279B83B9 
F86257CE700506EAD/$FILE/000010BC.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F4VC 
-8SE2. The audit examined the records of the Office of Conservation and 
compared the agency’s performance with that of other states. See, e.g., id. at 3. 
The legislative auditor found numerous deficiencies in the agency’s enforcement 
efforts, including but not limited to: (1) the agency was granting unauthorized 
exemptions from its regulations to operators; (2) the agency was not inspecting 
the majority of oilfield sites with the frequency required by its own rules; (3) the 
agency “did not consistently or timely address violations cited on inspections”; 
(4) the agency imposed civil penalties for violations “infrequently” and often did 
not collect fines when it did impose them; (5) the agency often did not conduct 
re-inspections of sites where it had found violations to see if the operator had 
corrected them or otherwise satisfied the agency’s compliance orders; and (6) 
the agency “did not consistently issue penalties after re-inspections found that 
operators with compliance orders still had not corrected violations.” Id. at 3–4.  
 Not surprisingly, the legislative auditor concluded that the agency’s 
“enforcement actions may not be deterring noncompliance” after determining 
that 63% of violators over the five-year period from 2008 to 2013 had failed 
multiple inspections. Id. at 4. In all, the legislative auditor made 21 
“recommendations” for reforming the agency’s deficient enforcement efforts. 
Each recommendation listed the agency’s response. See id. at 6–33. The agency 
did not dispute a single recommendation.  
 The 2014 audit was the third legislative audit since 2001 criticizing the 
enforcement efforts of the Office of Conservation. An audit published on 
January 5, 2001, entitled Water Quality in Louisiana determined that the 
Department of Natural Resources was not inspecting injection wells in 
accordance with its own policies. LA. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE 
AUDIT REPORT–DEP’T OF NAT. RES., WATER QUALITY IN LOUISIANA (Jan. 
2001). In March of 2004, the legislative auditor again concluded that the agency 
was ineffective in enforcing its own rules and regulations. LA. LEGISLATIVE 
AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT–DEP’T OF NAT. RES., LOUISIANA 
COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM (Mar. 2004). 
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and landowners. For the most part, that law is collected in Title 31 
of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, which contains the Louisiana 
Mineral Code.24  
The principal focus here is on the private law issues raised by 
oil and gas operations in the state. They are the ones that inspired 
the mythology that lies at the heart of the industry’s efforts to 
“reform” the law defining its responsibility.  
Unless modified by contract,25 the primary rule establishing the 
standard of care for mineral lessees in their operations is set forth 
in article 122 of the Mineral Code.26 That article, in pertinent part, 
provides: 
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his 
lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith 
and to develop and operate the property leased as a 
reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of 
himself and his lessor.27  
This duty to act as a “reasonably prudent operator” has become the 
subject of litigation in three principal ways: (1) drilling or 
production practices that cause premature loss of production and 
thus deprive landowners of mineral royalties they otherwise would 
have received (“downhole claims”);28 (2) contamination of soil and 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Act No. 50, 1974 La. Acts 237 (referring reader to Volume III of 
La. Acts); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-217 (2000). The Mineral Code was the 
product of more than 10 years of study, deliberation, and drafting by the 
Louisiana State Law Institute before being enacted by the 1974 Legislature and 
becoming effective on January 1, 1975. See John M. McCollam, A Primer for 
the Practice of Mineral Law under the New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. 
REV. 729 (1976) (providing influential commentary on the Mineral Code). 
 25. The Mineral Code makes it clear that both landowners and oil 
companies have the contractual freedom to alter their relations by modifying the 
default rules imposed by the Code. Article 3 specifically provides that the 
parties can modify the obligations set forth in the Code, so long as they are not 
prohibited by or against public policy. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (2000). 
Beyond that, article 122 of the Mineral Code expressly provides that the parties 
can agree to modify the lessee’s obligation of reasonable prudence. See id. § 
31:122. Specifically, it states that the parties “may stipulate what shall constitute 
reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.” Id. The Louisiana 
Supreme Court has not hesitated to enforce contractual modifications of the 
default standard if agreed upon between mineral lessor and lessee. See, e.g., 
Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So. 2d 597 (La. 1999); Magnolia Coal Terminal v. 
Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991); Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 
231 So. 2d 347 (La. 1969). 
 26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:122 (2000).  
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Frankel v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 So. 2d 55 (La. Ct. App. 
2005); Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters, 837 
So. 2d 11 (La. Ct. App. 2002).  
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groundwater that gives rise to landowner claims for the cost of 
restoring their property (so-called “legacy lawsuits”);29 and (3) the 
dredging of canals in the coastal zone that introduced saltwater 
intrusion into freshwater coastal marshes and resulted in the 
destruction of the buffer zone for storm surges (“coastal land 
loss”).30 
These claims are really nothing new. Landowners have filed 
private damage claims against oil companies in Louisiana31 and 
elsewhere for generations.32 However, the 2003 decision of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in Corbello v. Iowa Production Co. was 
perceived by the industry as a watershed event,33 presumably 
because the court affirmed a $33 million restoration award against 
Shell Oil Company for its contamination of a 320-acre farm in 
southwest Louisiana.34  
                                                                                                             
 29. See, e.g., Corbello v. Iowa Prod. Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).  
 30.  The leading case in this genre was instituted in July 2013 in Civil 
District Court for Orleans Parish and presents a claim against 97 oil companies 
for coastal land loss. The case was filed on behalf of the Southeast Louisiana 
Flood Protection Authority–East. The author and his firm are part of the team of 
attorneys representing the plaintiff, headed by Gladstone Jones of Jones, 
Swanson, Huddell & Garrison, LLC. The case was subsequently removed to 
federal court and was dismissed on February 13, 2015. An appeal is currently 
pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Bd. of 
Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.–East v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No. 
2:13-cv-05410 (E.D. La. 2014), dismissed (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2015); see also 
Nathaniel Rich, The Most Ambitious Environmental Lawsuit Ever, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/02/magazine 
/mag-oil-lawsuit.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/X8D3-R8C6. 
 31.  See, e.g., Duhon v. Buckley, 161 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1964). 
 32.  See, e.g., Marblehead Land Co. v. City of L.A., 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 
1931); Magnolia Petroleum v. Smith, 238 S.W. 56 (Ark. 1922); Hamilton v. E. 
Kan. Oil Co., 173 P. 911 (Kan. 1918); Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 37 
S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1931). 
 33. Corbello v. Iowa Prod. Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003). The state 
Supreme Court has referred to the laws passed since 2003 as “Corbello laws.” 
For instance, the first post-Corbello law, passed in 2003, has been referred to as 
the “Corbello Act” in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 240 n.7 (La. 
2010). The Corbello decision continues to inspire substantial (and industry-
sympathetic) commentary in the legal literature of the state. See, e.g., Kaki J. 
Johnson, Comment, The Migration from the Rig to the Courthouse: Oil and Gas 
Legacy Litigation in Louisiana, 60 LOY. L. REV. 647 (2014); David B. Means, 
III, Surface Owner Issues in the Mineral Owner, Lessee and Landowner 
Relationships, 53 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 219 (2006); Mary Beth Balhoff, 
Comment, Corbello v. Iowa Production and the Implications of Restoration 
Damages in Louisiana: Drilling Holes in Deep Pockets for Thirty-Three Million 
Dollars, 65 LA. L. REV. 271 (2004). 
 34. The award for cleaning up contamination was less than half of the total 
amount recovered. The majority of the total recovery came from additional 
1260 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
The size of the award, and the widespread publicity about the case 
throughout the legal community, fueled industry fears that it would 
soon face an avalanche of multi-million-dollar contamination claims. 
Industry leaders quickly put an army of lobbyists on full alert and, 
before the judgment in the Corbello case was even final, proposed 
legislation “reforming” contamination laws.35 The landowner 
interests responded with lobbyists of their own, and a crude 
compromise was reached in the 2003 Session that altered certain 
aspects of the litigation of contamination claims. Since then, the 
industry has encamped its lobbyists at the state capitol during 
virtually every legislative session and, with the support of Governor 
Bobby Jindal, has enjoyed more success in changing the procedures 
and remedies applicable to claims by landowners.36  
Those lobbying efforts—and the rhetoric of sympathetic public 
officials—have sounded certain themes that warrant close 
examination. 
III. IDENTIFYING THE MYTHS 
Even the most casual observer of marketing advocacy recognizes 
that the key to persuasion is a simple theme, repeated over and over.37 
That propaganda tactic is apparent in the industry’s lobbying efforts 
in Baton Rouge. The oil and gas lobbying theme has three distinct 
threads: 
1. “We need the oil companies more than they need us.” 
2. “If we do anything the oil companies do not like, they 
will leave.” 
3. “Greedy lawyers and frivolous lawsuits are driving oil 
companies out of Louisiana.” 
These are the principal myths surrounding oil and gas in Louisiana. 
Like the legend of Bigfoot, they are persistent even without proof. 
Because of their impact on the legal process, they need to be tested 
as all assertions are tested in the legal system: with a careful 
examination of the facts urged in support of them. 
                                                                                                             
 
damage awards for unlawful saltwater disposal and trespassing. Corbello, 850 
So. 2d at 705–08. 
 35. See VERON, SHELL GAME, supra note 10, at 8–12.  
 36. See, e.g., Act No. 1166, 2003 La. Acts 3511; Act No. 312, 2006 La. 
Acts 1472; Act No. 400, 2014 La. Acts. 
 37. “The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless 
one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly—it must confine itself to 
a few points and repeat them over and over.” Statement of Nazi Minister of 
Propaganda Josef Goebbels. 
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A. Debunking Myth No. 1: “We need the oil companies more than 
they need us.” 
A consistent theme of national television marketing by the 
major oil companies is the economic benefit generated by their 
activities—particularly, job creation. A prominent example of this 
has been BP’s television advertising in Louisiana in the aftermath 
of the Gulf Oil Spill,38 which emphasizes the great economic 
impact of BP’s activities. In the process, this advertising message 
also plays upon the unspoken fear that, if the state is not entirely 
hospitable to the oil interests, the industry will pull back its 
business activities—the drilling and production of oil and gas—
and in the process, bad things will happen to the state’s economy. 
Any reasonable analysis of this fear tactic should logically 
begin by testing the assertion that the industry is a critical job-
creator that deserves special consideration under the law. That 
suggests, at the very least, an investigation into how many jobs are 
actually created by the energy sector as compared to other parts of 
our state’s economy. A reliable source for this information can be 
found in the governor’s annual executive budget, which lists 
various job sectors in the state by industry.  
Governor Jindal’s executive budget for the fiscal year 2013–
2014 lists ten different employment sectors.39 For “natural 
resources and mining”—presumably the industry sector for oil and 
gas—the governor’s budget figures estimate 58,000 jobs.40 In 
comparison, the budget identifies the leisure and hospitality 
industry—the sector dependent on the environment for fresh 
seafood, good hunting, restaurants, and tourism—as creating 
210,000 jobs.41 To put this into perspective, the “natural resources 
and mining” sector is ninth out of ten employment sectors 
identified in the governor’s budget in terms of jobs created. 
“Leisure and hospitality” is ranked third.42 
                                                                                                             
 38. For an interesting discussion of BP’s advertising strategy for Louisiana in 
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon Spill, see Cain Burdeau, BP Ad Campaign 
Following Gulf Oil Spill Deemed “Propaganda” by Some, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 8, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/08/bp-ad-
campaign-gulf-oil-_n_1192600.html, archived at http://perma.cc /K2RJ-6AV2.  
 39. OFFICE OF PLANNING & BUDGET, GOVERNOR’S EXECUTIVE BUDGET: 
FISCAL YEAR 2013–2014, at 5 (2013), available at http://www.doa.louisiana.gov 
/opb/pub/FY14/FY14ExecutiveBudget.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EY79-
G56F. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
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In simple terms, these figures would appear to indicate that the 
economic sector that depends on a clean environment is responsible 
for nearly four times more jobs in Louisiana than the oil industry.43 
Of course, outside of television ads by the lieutenant governor, the 
statewide official charged with promoting tourism,44 there is no 
financially interested, unified economic force to speak for the 
environment or pay for its commercials. If there were, it might 
sponsor advertising messages that contamination and coastal land 
loss from oilfield operations can potentially cost many more jobs 
and cause far greater economic disruption than the prospect of oil 
companies pulling up stakes for lack of sympathy. 
Beyond that, there is considerable collateral damage caused by 
oilfield operations in Louisiana. Neither the fact of the damage nor 
its cost of repair is imaginary—and the best source of evidence on 
that is not Greenpeace or Save the Whales, but rather the industry 
itself and the state agencies with whom it is so friendly. 
The industry’s literature has documented the environmental 
disasters associated with historic oil and gas operations, particularly 
its use and abandonment of oilfield waste pits. For instance, in 1987, 
members of the petroleum engineering faculty at LSU authored a 
peer-reviewed study in the Journal of Petroleum Technology—the 
official journal of the Society of Petroleum Engineers—
documenting extensive contamination from abandoned oilfield 
pits.45 The authors concluded that “[t]here are . . . about 12,000 
abandoned pits in Louisiana that are suspected of chronic damage 
to the environment and to public health.”46 Nor can anyone 
seriously claim that this state of affairs was a surprise to the 
industry. Its leading organization, the American Petroleum 
Institute, began warning its oil company members about the 
environmental consequences of utilizing unlined waste pits as far 
back as 1932.47 In one paper, a leading representative of the 
organization stated: “We are only ‘kidding’ ourselves when we 
                                                                                                             
 43. Given that Governor Jindal is an outspoken ally of the oil industry, one 
would expect these statistics to be as favorable to energy as possible. 
 44. Office of Lieutenant Governor, LA. DEP’T OF CULTURE RECREATION & 
TOURISM, http://www.crt.state.la.us/lt-governor/terms-of-office/index, archived 
at http://perma.cc/E79C-CAJ5 (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).  
 45. See A.K. Wojtanowicz, S.D. Field, & M.C. Osterman, Comparison 
Study of Solid/Liquid Separation Techniques for Oilfield Pit Closures, J. 
PETROLEUM TECH., July 1987, at 845.  
 46. Id. 
 47. V.L. Martin, Disposal of Production Division Wastes, Presentation 
Before the American Petroleum Institute (Apr. 12, 1932). 
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think we can dispose of salt water by solar evaporation from 
earthen ponds.”48 Explaining further, the author said: 
What we have attributed to evaporation was due to seepage 
. . . . Eventually, such seepage may either follow an 
impervious stratum to the surface where it may affect 
vegetation or may find its way to fresh water sources, either 
surface or subsurface, and in such quantities as to be 
objectionable.49 
The industry literature published further warnings from the 
American Petroleum Institute, the Society of Petroleum Engineers, 
and other recognized authorities over the decades thereafter that 
storing brine, or salt water, in unlined pits contaminated subsurface 
soil and water.50 
For these reasons, Louisiana’s neighbors in Texas and 
Oklahoma began to outlaw the use of unlined earthen pits as early 
as 1955.51 Regrettably, Louisiana was unable to muster the 
political will to do so until 1986, when the Office of Conservation 
promulgated its first oilfield pit rules.52 Even then, however, 
oilfield operators were put on the honor system to register their pits 
and were given three years to close them.53 They were not even 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. at 7.  
 49. Id. at 8. 
 50. See, e.g., R.M. Russell, Environmental Liability Considerations in the 
Valuation and Appraisal of Producing Oil and Gas Properties, J. PETROLEUM 
TECH., Jan. 1989, at 55; Arthur J.J. Leuterman, Fredrick V. Jones, & John E. 
Candler, Drilling Fluids and Reserve Pit Toxicity, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Nov. 
1988, at 1441; Roy D. Payne, Salt Water Pollution Problems in Texas, J. 
PETROLEUM TECH., Nov. 1966, at 1401; Henry Lewelling & Monte Kaplan, 
What To Do About Salt Water, 31 PETROLEUM ENG’R, July 1959, at B-19; H.H. 
Elliston & W.B. Davis, A Method of Handling Salt-Water Disposal, Including 
Treatment of Water, in DRILLING AND PRODUCTION PRACTICE 122–45 (Am. 
Petroleum Inst., 1944). 
 51. For Texas, the appropriate regulatory agency is the Texas Railroad 
Commission. Its first order outlawing the use of unlined pits for brine storage 
was issued in 1955. See Special Order Pertaining to Disposal of Salt and Sulphur 
Water Produced Incident to the Production of Oil and Gas in the Rodman-Noel 
(Grayburg) Field, Upton County, Texas, Oil and Gas Docket No. 7-32,629, 
December 19, 1955. For a general discussion, see Ivan M. Rice, Crack Down on 
Oil Field Pollution, PETROLEUM ENG’R, July 1967, at 33 (stating that Texas and 
Oklahoma had outlawed the use of unlined pits). 
 52. These rules came in the form of an amendment to Statewide Order 29-
B. History, LA. DEP’T NATURAL RES., OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, http://dnr 
.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=47&pnid=0&nid=2
2, archived at http://perma.cc/B7AH-CVBM (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 53. One industry expert, petroleum engineer Calvin Barnhill, described the 
system as “self-reporting.” Dep. of Calvin Barnhill at 152, C.F. Henry Props. 
LLC v. Apache Corp., (No. 10-18063) (2011) (on file with author). Presumably, 
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required to submit tests regarding pit constituents or impacts on the 
surrounding area—just to keep such information on file in case it 
was needed.54 
As the Department of Environmental Quality has recognized, 
“[s]everely polluted water can be cleaned, but only at high cost.”55 
Thus, the greatest challenge posed by the thousands of abandoned 
oilfield pits is the enormous cost and difficulty associated with 
cleaning them up. Left unattended, most contamination spreads 
over time, which expands the contamination plume and in turn 
raises the cost of remediation exponentially. Thus, even if the job 
creation myth were entirely true, it does not come without a 
significant cost. 
Another environmental cost associated with oilfield operations 
that is easily measured is the number of “orphaned” wells in 
Louisiana. Under the state’s regulatory scheme, any well that is no 
longer productive must be “plugged and abandoned” in accordance 
with Statewide Order 29-B.56 The purpose of this procedure is to 
protect the soil and water around the well by requiring that it be 
properly sealed. However, only the last operator of record is 
responsible for plugging and abandoning a well in accordance with 
Statewide Order 29-B.57 Thus, if the last operator of record—typically 
a marginal entity who took over the well after previous operators 
picked all the “low-hanging fruit”—becomes impecunious, the well 
becomes an “orphan” and must be plugged by the state.58 
                                                                                                             
 
this is akin to allowing speeding motorists to report themselves to the state 
police. 
 54. See Dep’t of Natural Res., Amendment to Statewide Order of No. 29-B 
(Jan. 20, 1986). Amendment section 2.6(E) states:  
Documentation of testing and closure activities, including onsite 
disposal of NOW, shall be maintained in operator’s files for at least 
three (3) years after completion of closure activities. Upon notification, 
the Office of Conservation may require the operator to furnish these 
data for verification of proper closure of any pit. If proper onsite 
closure has not been accomplished, the operator will be required to 
bring the sit into compliance with applicable requirements.  
Id.  
 55. LA. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, WATER QUALITY ASSESSMENT DIV., 
WATER QUALITY STUDY GUIDE 1 (2005).  
 56. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, § 137 (2005) [hereinafter Statewide 
Order 29-B]. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Oilfield Site Restoration (OSR) Program, LA. DEP’T NATURAL RES., 
OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder 
&tmp=home&pid=155, archived at http://perma.cc/4BRJ-7TJK (last visited Feb. 
13, 2015).  
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A fund was created for this purpose in 1993, financed in the 
form of a fee on oil and gas production that is paid quarterly by 
operators in the state.59 The fund is administered by the 
Department of Natural Resources for the declared purpose of 
“address[ing] the growing problem of unrestored orphaned oilfield 
sites across the State.”60  
However, the fund is plainly inadequate. As of 2010, the Office 
of Conservation reported that there were 2,833 “orphaned” wells 
registered in the program. Because of minimal funding, only 160 
are plugged each year.61 Thus, assuming no new “orphaned” wells 
appear, it would take 17 additional years just to plug the existing 
orphan wells.62 
Another consequence of oilfield operations is coastal land loss in 
south Louisiana. In order to drill and operate wells in the freshwater 
coastal marshes, operators had to dredge canals to reach drilling 
locations. In order to dredge canals in those protected areas, they 
were required to secure state permits. Those state permits—which 
the operators were required to sign—more often than not included 
a stipulation that the canals that were dredged would be maintained 
and would be restored to original condition when operations were 
concluded.63  
                                                                                                             
 59. The program is known as the Louisiana Oilfield Site Restoration (OSR) 
Program. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Louisiana’s Orphaned Well Program: Fact Sheet, LA. DEP’T NATURAL 
RES. (June 30, 2010), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp 
=detail&aid=17, archived at http://perma.cc/6VY4-C7YZ. 
 62. Id.  
 63. The permits are issued by the Office of Coastal Management in the 
Department of Natural Resources. The agency publishes a “Coastal User’s 
Guide” that explains the rules governing operations within Louisiana’s coastal 
zone. See LA. DEP’T NATURAL RES., OFFICE OF COASTAL MGMT., A COASTAL 
USER’S GUIDE TO THE LOUISIANA COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM (2015), 
available at http://data.dnr.louisiana.gov/LCP/LCPHANDBOOK/FinalUsers 
Guide.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8GBD-FGCQ. The boundaries of the 
coastal zone are set by statute and include most of south Louisiana below 
Interstate 10. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.23 (2012). Permits to conduct 
oil and gas operations within the coastal zone are referred to as “Coastal Use 
Permits” (CUPs). They are a matter of public record and can be accessed at the 
Department of Natural Resources. Copies of numerous permits for the dredging 
of canals in the coastal zone are on file with the author. Beyond the permits 
themselves, state coastal zone regulations also require restoration of oilfield sites 
to their original condition: “Mineral exploration and production sites shall be 
cleared, revegetated, detoxified, and otherwise restored as near as practicable to 
their original condition upon termination of operations to the maximum extent 
practicable.” LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 1, § 719(M) (2012). 
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It is now estimated that nearly 10,000 miles of canals were 
dredged through the freshwater marshes of coastal Louisiana.64 
Those canals exposed the roots of the fresh water marsh grasses to 
salt water from the Gulf of Mexico. The salt water killed the roots. 
When the roots died, the dirt they held in place sloughed off. The 
canals widened, exposing new roots, which the salt water then 
killed as well. This cycle resulted in a remarkable widening of the 
canals. Photographs over time show entire regions becoming 
submerged. Numerous small communities in south Louisiana 
disappeared. Despite the promises made by the oil companies in 
the permits, virtually none of the hundreds of canals dredged 
across the coastal region of Louisiana have been restored. 
The extent of coastal land loss in Louisiana is well 
documented. Between 1930 and 2000, over 1900 square miles 
disappeared from south Louisiana.65 That is an area roughly the 
size of the State of Delaware or, closer to home, the size of Orleans 
Parish, Jefferson Parish, St. Bernard Parish, Plaquemines Parish, 
and St. John the Baptist Parish combined.66 
There is a very practical, cascading consequence to this reality 
of coastal land loss. Hurricanes strengthen over water and weaken 
                                                                                                             
 64. See, e.g., Cain Burdreau, Oil Canals’ Role in La. Losses Debated, ABC 
NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=4162431, archived at http://perma 
.cc/VAQ7-UMTX (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); John Tibbetts, Louisiana’s Wetlands: 
A Lesson in Nature Appreciation, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS., Jan. 2006, at A40. Walt 
Handelsman, the editorial cartoonist for The Advocate, portrayed the problem in the 
March 30, 2014 edition of the newspaper in this manner:  
 
  
See Walt Handelsman for March 30, 2014, THE ADVOCATE (June 11, 2014), 
http://theadvocate.com/multimedia/walthandelsman/8756888-123/walt-handels 
man-for-march-30, archived at http://perma.cc/NV8E-4KUY.  
 65. See, e.g., Russel L. Honore, Op-Ed., Safeguarding Louisiana’s Coastline, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/opinion/safeguard 
ing-louisianas-coastline.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/28GX-998K; Press 
Release, Nat’l Wetlands Research Ctr., Without Restoration, Coastal Land Loss to 
Continue (May 21, 2003), http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/releases/pr03_004.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/75VU-HYH2. 
 66. U.S. Geological Survey, How Are Louisiana Wetlands Changing?, 
USGS (June 2, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article 
.asp?ID=2816#.VQn-xE1uiUk, archived at http://perma.cc/EE3Q-Z3NS. 
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over land. The land in south Louisiana forms a vital buffer zone for 
storm surge that constitutes the state’s first line of defense against 
hurricane damage. As that buffer zone disappears, the last line of 
defense—the levees of the Mississippi River—become further 
exposed.  
Those levees were built to withstand a 100-year storm, which 
happens to be the lowest standard in the civilized world.67 Simply 
put, the levees—and the cities they protect, such as New Orleans—
need the buffer zone to weaken storm surge before it strikes them. 
Unrestored oil industry canals have destroyed that line of 
protection and now imperil New Orleans and other critical areas of 
the state. 
This is well documented. Indeed, over the past 50 years, 
numerous studies have been conducted to document coastal land 
loss.68 Some of them have been either sponsored by industry or 
conducted with the input and participation of industry partners.  
One study, by the U.S. Geological Survey, concluded that 
“[o]il and gas ranks the highest process of coastal land loss at 
249,152 acres or 36.06% of the total loss.”69 Even the Louisiana 
Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association agreed that “[the] effects of 
canal development tend to be the overwhelming cause of wetland 
losses.”70 The Coastal Protection and Restoration Commission also 
posted the following statement on Governor Jindal’s website: 
Canal dredging has had one of the most dramatic effects on 
wetland growth and regeneration. In addition to directly 
destroying marshes in the path of the canal, the plants are 
unable to recolonize, and thus the marsh is unable to 
                                                                                                             
 67. See, e.g., Robert L. Reid, Defending New Orleans, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL 
ENG’RS (Nov. 2013), http://www.arcadis-us.com/Content/ArcadisUS/docs/News 
/AUS_DefendingNewOrleans_ASCE.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T6UL- 
6FGW; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, LOUISIANA COASTAL PROTECTION AND 
RESTORATION–FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT (June 2009); JOS DIKMAN, A DUTCH 
PERSPECTIVE ON COASTAL LOUISIANA FLOOD RISK REDUCTION AND LANDSCAPE 
STABILIZATION (Oct. 2007); NAT. ACADEMIES KECK CTR., GILBERT F. WHITE 
NATIONAL FLOOD POLICY FORUM, REDUCING FLOOD LOSSES: IS THE 1% CHANCE 
(100-YEAR) FLOOD STANDARD SUFFICIENT? (2004). 
 68. See SHEA PENLAND ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PROCESS 
CLASSIFICATION OF COASTAL LAND LOSS BETWEEN 1932 AND 1990 IN THE 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER DELTA PLAIN, SOUTHEASTERN LOUISIANA (2000), available 
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2000/of00-418/ofr00-418.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/ACZ5-BMTL. 
 69. Id. 
 70. LA. UNIVS. MARINE CONSORTIUM ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF 
PRODUCED WATER DISCHARGES IN COASTAL LOUISIANA: REPORT TO THE 
LOUISIANA DIVISION OF THE MID -CONTINENT OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION (July 
1989). 
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regenerate itself. Once canals are dredged, most grow 
larger as the sustainable areas of marsh subsequently 
decrease.71 
All of this calls into question whether we need oil companies 
more than they need us. Indeed, the myth of oil company 
dependency completely ignores that the resource bringing the oil 
companies here belongs to us, not them. At the risk of stating the 
obvious, the oil companies are here only because of oil. They are 
not here to create jobs; they are here to make a profit producing a 
resource belonging to the state and its citizens. That is a perfectly 
legitimate motive, but it needs to be recognized for what it is. 
Obviously, the oil companies will not be drilling wells after that 
resource is exhausted. 
B. Debunking Myth No. 2: “If we do anything the oil companies do 
not like, they will leave.” 
The second myth is that the oil companies will leave Louisiana 
if we do anything they do not like. This is a corollary of the first 
myth, which is that we need the oil companies more than they need 
us. Those who unthinkingly repeat this myth often overlook 
obvious facts. 
Oil company profits come, obviously, from producing oil. 
Profits are maximized by producing the best prospects—the low-
hanging fruit. The low-hanging fruit in Louisiana was picked long 
ago. After 60 to 70 years of production, the major oil companies 
(e.g., Exxon, Amoco, and Texaco) began to leave Louisiana in the 
1980s and 1990s in search of low-hanging fruit elsewhere. For 
instance, Amoco sold most of its Louisiana interests to Apache in a 
$515 million transaction in May of 1991.72 
                                                                                                             
 71. Shortly after the SLFPA-E lawsuit was filed, the statement was 
modified to read: “Dredging canals for oil and gas exploration and pipelines 
provided our nation with critical energy supplies, but these activities also took a 
toll on the landscape, weakening marshes and allowing salt water to spread 
higher into coastal basins.” Coastal Crisis, COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION 
AUTH., http://coastal.la.gov/whats-at-stake/coastal-crisis/, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/6H69-URQB (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). Although evidence of Governor 
Jindal’s original statement has since been removed from his website, a copy of 
the statement is on file with the author.  
 72. Apache to Double Reserves with Amoco Deal, OIL & GAS J. (May 13, 
1991), http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-89/issue-19/in-this-issue/drilling 
/apache-to-double-reserves-with-amoco-deal.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2FXT 
-9CKW. 
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That had nothing to do with litigation outcomes; indeed, the 
watershed Corbello decision was years away.73 Rather, it was 
driven by fundamental oilfield economics. When the price of oil is 
high, drilling activity increases. When prospects are accessible and 
cheap to drill, drilling activity in that locale increases. Easy 
prospects are drilled before difficult prospects. 
There is no better example of this than the Haynesville Shale 
play in north Louisiana. When that prospect was first discovered, 
leases were purchased at astronomical prices per acre.74 Landowners 
became overnight multi-millionaires in the rush among the oil 
companies to acquire acreage overlaying the shale. However, lease 
prices dropped precipitously when wetter gas was discovered in 
other shale formations in Pennsylvania, Alabama, Texas, and North 
Dakota. 
All of this indicates that displays of sympathy and hospitality 
in the legislative and court systems play no role in exploration and 
production decisions. The oil companies will come to Louisiana 
and drill for its oil and gas as long as there are profitable amounts 
of accessible oil and gas to produce. If not, all the “friendly” laws 
and court decisions in the world will not influence the geologists 
and petroleum engineers’ evaluations of prospects in the state. 
C. Debunking Myth No. 3: “Greedy lawyers and frivolous lawsuits 
are driving oil companies out of Louisiana.” 
The third myth is most frequently cited by political leaders to 
justify enacting “reforms” of oil company responsibility for 
damage. Specifically, the mantra in Baton Rouge—one that was 
first sounded during the tort reform movement in the 1990s―has 
been that “greedy lawyers and frivolous lawsuits are driving oil 
companies out of Louisiana.” The legal profession—both lawyers 
and the courts—has served as a kind of whipping boy for the 
Legislature in recent years. Noticeably, this theme has become 
more pronounced as the number of lawyers in the Legislature has 
declined. 
This theme has been a drum beat of certain industry 
representatives, the most vocal of whom has been Don Briggs, the 
president of a group called the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association 
                                                                                                             
 73. See Corbello v. Iowa Prod. Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003). 
 74. See, e.g., Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311, 314 
(5th Cir. 2012) (“In July 2008 Chesapeake Exploration LLC entered into an 
agreement to purchase deep rights held by Peak Energy Corporation in certain 
oil and gas leases in the Haynesville Shale formation, for the hefty sum of 
$15,000 per acre.”).  
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(LOGA).75 In marshalling support for legislative favors for the 
industry, Mr. Briggs declared: 
Plaintiff attorneys are slowly killing your economy. . . . The 
personal injury and class action plaintiff’s bar is running 
business out of your state. My perception and experience is 
that the plaintiff’s bar owns the Louisiana judiciary.76 
As a corollary of this, Mr. Briggs repeatedly declared that there was 
a direct causal effect between lawsuits and declining rig counts.77 
There was a day of reckoning for this myth. In late 2013, Mr. 
Briggs and LOGA filed a lawsuit against the attorney general of 
Louisiana seeking a declaration that his approval of a contract by 
which the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East 
hired lawyers to pursue coastal land loss claims against the oil 
industry was illegal.78 Having voluntarily subjected himself to the 
jurisdiction of the court, Mr. Briggs was required to sit for a 
deposition. Under questioning by one of the lawyers for the flood 
protection authority, Mr. Briggs admitted under oath—over and 
over—that he had no evidence or information that any oil company 
                                                                                                             
 75. See Don Briggs, LOGA, http://loga.la/loga/loga-staff/don-briggs/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/DWT4-TKPY (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).  
 76. Don G. Briggs, Legacy-Site Litigation: A Feeding Frenzy of Nuisance 
Lawsuits, LOGA (Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.loga.la/articles/040916.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/FML2-9MZG. 
 77. See, e.g., Don G. Briggs, As Legacy Lawsuit Count Rises, Rig Count 
Falls, LA. RECORD (Mar. 13, 2014), http://louisianarecord.com/arguments 
/259337-as-legacy-lawsuit-count-rises-rig-count-falls, archived at http://perma 
.cc/4PSG-PXM6. Mr. Briggs’s son, Gifford Briggs, tours the state regurgitating 
the same thing. See Billy Gunn, Industry Leaders Blame “Greedy Lawyers” for 
Drop in Offshore Drilling, THE ADVOCATE (Mar. 20, 2014), http://theadvocate 
.com/news/8622813-123/greedy-trial-lawyers-blamed-for, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/8ZES-538K. In signing the most recent legislation sought by the industry, 
Governor Jindal declared that the coastal land loss litigation brought by one of 
the state’s flood protection agencies was “frivolous” and that he was “proud” to 
sign a law directed to defeating that lawsuit because it “further improves 
Louisiana’s legal environment by reducing unnecessary claims that burden 
businesses so that we can bring even more jobs to our state.” Neela Banerjee, 
Louisiana Governor Signs Law to Block Suits against Oil Industry, L.A. TIMES 
(June 6, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-louisiana-lawsuit-jindal-
20140606-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4FD7-KLVZ. Award-winning 
author John M. Barry, who helped initiate the lawsuit while on the board of the 
flood protection authority (before being removed by Governor Jindal), 
responded: “Is there a single person in Louisiana who believes the governor is 
putting the state’s interest ahead of his personal ambition?” Id. 
 78. The lawsuit was filed by LOGA in the 19th Judicial District Court in 
East Baton Rouge Parish on December 13, 2013. See La. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Inc. 
v. Caldwell, No. 626,798 (La. 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. 2013).  
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had ever left Louisiana or failed to drill a single oil or gas well 
because of the threat of lawsuits or the legal climate.79 
Despite this well-publicized setback,80 Mr. Briggs’s theme 
continues to enjoy support from an organization called the American 
Tort Reform Foundation, which publishes an annual ranking that 
usually lists Louisiana as among states it characterizes as “judicial 
hellholes” of the United States.81 Leaving aside that this 
organization does not identify its constituents or funding sources, its 
only criterion for qualifying a state as a “hellhole” appears to be its 
                                                                                                             
 79. Consider the following excerpts from Mr. Briggs’s sworn testimony: 
Q: Do you have any evidence that any oil company considers the 
Louisiana legal climate in deciding whether they will drill for oil and 
gas in Louisiana? 
A: No. 
Q: Is it your opinion that oil and gas companies are leaving Louisiana 
because of the threat of lawsuits? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Which oil companies have left Louisiana because of lawsuits? 
A: I don’t know. 
Q: Do you have any facts or data to support your opinion? 
A: No. 
. . .  
Q: Do you know of any oil companies that specifically have not drilled 
because of the legal climate? 
A: No. 
. . . 
Q: Give us a name of an oil company that has refused to do business in 
Louisiana because of lawsuits. 
A: I don’t know any. 
 
Q: You don’t have any facts or data anywhere else? 
A: No. 
. . . 
Q: Can you name any wells that were not drilled because of lawsuits? 
A: No. 
Dep. of Donald G. Briggs at 47–48, 62, 63, Caldwell, available at http://www 
.theind.com/extras/Official-Transcript-Briggs-Depo.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/RG7P-ARRJ. 
 80. Briggs was roasted in the media, which understandably felt betrayed to 
learn that the propaganda he had been feeding them over the years had no 
factual basis. See, e.g., Clancy DuBos, Briggs’ Pathetic Performance, GAMBIT 
(Feb. 27, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://www.bestofneworleans.com/blogofneworleans 
/archives/2014/02/27/briggs-pathetic-performance, archived at http://perma.cc 
/5FHZ-VDXR; James Gill, Industry Spokesman Doesn’t Worry about the Facts, 
THE ADVOCATE (June 12, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/columnists/8496400-
55/james-gill-industry-spokesman-doesn’t, archived at http://perma.cc/P8VA-
PHB6. 
 81. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2014–2015, at 3, 4–5 
(2014), available at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2014 
/12/JudicialHellholes-2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NQ7L-QU4C. 
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subjective determination that “judges in civil cases systematically 
apply laws and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced 
manner, generally to the disadvantage of defendants.”82 
Apparently, the bar for becoming a judicial “hellhole” is set rather 
low: there is no evidence of any other criterion, such as whether 
there was any identifiable error in either the evidence or the law in 
any given court decision. 
The industry continued its attack on lawyers and the courts by 
enlisting the aid of David Dismukes, now the executive director of 
the LSU Center for Energy Studies. Dismukes authored an essay in 
February 2012 entitled “The Impact of Legacy Lawsuits on 
Conventional Oil and Gas Drilling in Louisiana.”83 This publication 
essentially repeated LOGA’s charge that lawsuits by landowners for 
the contamination of their property were discouraging oil companies 
from drilling in the state.84  
However, e-mails obtained from LSU under state public 
records laws revealed that Exxon had furnished the alleged data for 
the essay, had apparently instructed Dismukes on how to present 
the data, and had retained editorial approval of the essay.85 Another 
e-mail from Dismukes to his assistant complained about feeling 
pressure from Exxon and Chevron and wanting to get them “off 
my back.”86 When attorneys attempted to subpoena Dismukes to 
depose him about his essay, he ran his car into the process server’s 
vehicle while attempting to avoid being served.87 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. at 2. 
 83. DAVID E. DISMUKES, THE IMPACT OF LEGACY LAWSUITS ON 
CONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DRILLING IN LOUISIANA, LSU CTR. FOR ENERGY 
STUDIES (2012), available at http://www.enrg.lsu.edu/files/images/presentations 
/2012/DISMUKES_LEGACY_RPT_02-28-12_FINAL.pdf, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/6S2Q-87VN.  
 84. Id. at 3–17.  
 85. See Patrick Flanagan, Big Oil’s Behind-the-Scenes Role in LSU’s 
“Legacy Lawsuit” Study, ABIZ (Mar. 9, 2014), http://theind.com/article-16499-
big-oil’s-behind-the-scenes-role-in-lsu’s-‘legacy-lawsuit’-study.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/WH6W-HLAQ.  
 86. Deanna Narveson, LSU Professor’s Study Disputed, DAILY REVEILLE 
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.lsureveille.com/news/lsu-professor-s-study-disputed 
/article_46f3bada-af14-11e3-a8c3-0017a43b2370.html, archived at http://perma 
.cc/PJB7-6VEX.  
 87. Id. The accident report of the Baton Rouge Police Department is dated 
March 20, 2012, and a copy is on file with the author. Despite its evident flaws 
and biased data, at least one student commentator recently discussed Dismukes’ 
essay with apparent approval. Johnson, supra note 33, at 672–73. This Comment 
uncritically accepts and reiterates the myth that the “reforms” of oilfield 
contamination litigation were motivated by a desire to deter frivolous lawsuits. 
Id. at 682. It was apparently beyond the scope of that Comment to examine 
whether the underlying factual premise for that assertion was valid.  
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Aside from proving that confronting myths is not for the faint of 
heart, this kind of scapegoating is not new. Indeed, spokesmen of 
the oil industry have long reverted to the “greedy lawyers/frivolous 
lawsuits” refrain whenever a legal outcome is not to their liking. 
When the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided Corbello in 2003,88 
the industry hired LSU economist Loren C. Scott to tour the state, 
educate civic groups, and discuss the allegedly catastrophic effects 
of the decision. As part of his presentations, Scott warned a Houma 
audience that the Corbello decision had “really hammered your 
area.”89 
Of course, the sky did not fall after Corbello. To the contrary, 
drilling permits in Louisiana—which are a matter of public 
record—rose for six consecutive years after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling. Indeed, within two years of the decision, the number of 
drilling permits issued annually had actually doubled over the 
number they had been in the year before Corbello was handed 
down.90 Not surprisingly, the record number of drilling permits 
issued in Louisiana from 2005 to 2010 coincided with record 
                                                                                                             
 
 The rhetoric of “frivolous lawsuits” camouflages the real concern of those 
who seek to avoid being sued. Few defendants concern themselves with 
frivolous lawsuits. Certainly, none of the tort or oil and gas reformers is ever 
able to cite a frivolous lawsuit that was successful. The real concern, obviously, 
is that non-frivolous, or meritorious, lawsuits will be brought. Those are the 
ones that general genuine legal exposure or risk. 
 It also bears noting that landowners who sue oil companies bear the burden 
of proving their claims and that lawsuits against oil companies for destruction of 
formations, contamination, or coastal land loss must be supported by objective 
scientific and engineering evidence that meets the competency and reliability 
requirements of evidence law. See LA. CODE EVID. art. 702 (2015); State v. 
Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993). Unlike an automobile collision, oilfield cases 
cannot be won with subjective eyewitness recollections about who ran the red 
light. And while the reformers call for laws to prohibit “frivolous” lawsuits, 
none seem aware that a law already exists—and has since 1989—imposing 
sanctions against parties and lawyers who bring frivolous lawsuits. See LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 863 (2015).  
 88. Corbello v. Iowa Prod. Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).  
 89. Jason Mayo, Economist: Lawsuits Hurt Houma Job Growth, DAILY 
COMET.COM (June 16, 2004, 11:39 AM), http://www.dailycomet.com 
/article/20040616/BUSINESS/406160308, archived at http://perma.cc/QU9V-
P8C6. See VERON, SHELL GAME, supra note 10. Professor Scott was also paid to 
perform an economic study proving that the oil industry is a “giant economic 
engine” for the state. LOREN C. SCOTT, THE ENERGY SECTOR: A GIANT 
ECONOMIC ENGINE FOR THE LOUISIANA ECONOMY (1996). 
 90. That was the experience not only in Louisiana, but also in Texas and 
Arkansas. See Veron, Oilfield, supra note 15, at 16 and authorities cited therein. 
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prices for oil, proving that oil and gas activities are dictated by the 
price of the commodity, not litigation outcomes.91 
CONCLUSION: DOES BIGFOOT EXIST? 
Psychologists have long contended from studies that people 
tend to believe what they want to believe.92 In the extreme, legal 
scholars have referred to this condition as “deliberate ignorance.”93 
Thus, the answer to whether Bigfoot exists presumably depends to 
some extent on the predisposed eye of the beholder, something the 
cynic might say requires a fair amount of gullibility. However, one 
of the underlying purposes of our adversarial legal system is to test 
assertions of fact instead of accepting them uncritically. Viewed in 
this manner, the record does not support the mythology of oil and 
gas in Louisiana any more than it does the existence of Bigfoot. At 
the very least, confronting the false premises for these myths 
forces those who embrace them to re-evaluate their position or to 
admit the real reasons behind it. 
                                                                                                             
 91. Speaking at the LSU Law Center’s 57th Mineral Law Institute on April 
15, 2010, DNR Secretary Scott Angelle was unabashedly enthusiastic about the 
record numbers of drilling permits being issued in the state: “Well, what a heck 
of a run it’s been for all of us over the last five years. . . . Without question, it is 
time to end the ‘either/or’ debate on energy policy versus the environment.” 
Scott Angelle, Sec’y of La. Dep’t of Natural Res., Comments to LSU Law 
Center’s 57th Mineral Law Inst. (Apr. 15, 2010), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index 
.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&aid=29, archived at http://perma.cc/3KER-
NN3L.  
 92. See, e.g., Anthony Bastardi, Eric Luis Uhlmann, & Lee Ross, Wishful 
Thinking: Belief, Desire, and the Motivated Evaluation of Scientific Evidence, 
ASS’N FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. (Apr. 2011), http://socialjudgments.com/docs 
/Bastardi_Uhlmann_and_Ross_Wishful_Thinking.2011.pdf, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/J3AH-DK4H.  
 93. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance 
as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191 (1990).  
